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Competition and Co-operation: 
Restructuring the UK Steel Castings 
Industry 
C. W. F. B A D E N - F U L L E R  
The decade 1975-85 was a period of profound crisis for Europe’s mature industries 
such as steel, chemicals, cars and mechanical engineering: output declined, labour was 
shed, plants closed and profitability plummeted. Many firms found the necessary 
adjustments extremely difficult and most traditional industries did not emerge from 
their parlous state until the late 1980s. In this chapter I examine the steel castings 
industry to understand the cause of the general crisis and why it persisted for such a 
long time. The answers to these questions are of interest not only to historians, but also 
to present-day managers and policy makers. Crisis is not a phenomenon confined 
exclusively to the older manufacturing industries. In the late 1980s banking and other 
services experienced excess capacity and falling profits; these sectors may also benefit 
from understanding events in manufacturing. 
The steel castings industry may seem small, but during the decade in question its 
products were vital in the much larger engineering sector. The firms in the castings 
industry were diverse in size, ownership and back- ground. Some were parts of large, 
diversified enterprises, others were traditional specialists. Like much of the rest of 
British manufacturing, the industry experienced a dramatic fall in output: between 1975 
and 1983, orders fell by more than a half. 
Unravelling the recent history of this industry allows a better under- standing of exit 
barriers and why excess capacity can persist for a long time. In addition, it provides 
insights into the relative merit of co-operative as opposed to competitive behaviour. 
With the help of Lazard, the merchant bank, the industry  organized a collective 
rationalization scheme in 1982-3; subsequently there were a number of mergers. 
In undertaking my analysis I shall consider the process of adjustment: the speed and 
quality of labour shedding, the speed and quality of capacity adjustment and the 
redirection of firms’ activities within the industry. I find that change was slow, and that 
both behavioural and economic factors explain why the industry took more than ten 
years to adjust to events which started in the mid-1970s.
Barriers to Exit 
Rapid and sudden changes in demand cause problems for managers, firms and society 
because adjustment is nearly always costly and difficult. These costs and difficulties are 
particularly large in the technologically based industries of Western Europe. Asset s 
such as plant and machinery are frequently designed specifically for a particular 
industry and location; when demand declines or shifts, these assets are hard to move to 
another location where they may be needed and hard to use for producing some 
alternative good. Nor can firms abandon assets when they are no longer required; 
current laws and practices require managers to dismantle the plant and clean up the site. 
This is costly, and requires time and effort. Workers too have rights; they cannot be 
dismissed without notice and severance pay. Such arrangements are not only seen as 
socially necessary but may be reinforced by previous managerial actions designed to 
keep the loyalty of the workforce when labour was scarce. 
Caves and Porter coined the phrase ‘barriers to exit’ to capture the factors which 
make adjustment costly. Harrigan, and Ghemawat and Nalebuff, show how competitor 
behaviour can compound the difficulties; Bower and Daems extend the analysis to 
include governments.1 Two aspects of the structure of competition have been ignored 
by these writers: the role of single-plant versus multiplant firms and the role of 
undiversified versus diversified firms. It is argued here that being a single-plant, 
undiver- sified firm may constitute a barrier to exit from an industry. 
Single-plant and Undiversified Firms 
Firms which belong to undiversified groups may have higher adjustment costs than 
those which are diversified. Managing adjustment, in particular managing the closure 
of plant, requires a different set of skills from those of day-to-day operations. Whilst 
some undiversified firms are good at manag- ing change, in general many do not have 
experience in managing closure. In contrast, diversified firms are more likely to have 
such experience some- where in the group, and, in addition, other corporate skills and 
resources which allow them to tackle the closure process more effectively. 
There is an additional point to be made, arising from the fact that assets cannot be 
abandoned or workers easily dismissed. Closure requires action not just by senior 
managers but by a cross-section of all managers and workers. In a diversified firm, 
closure does not threaten the jobs of the most senior managers; moreover, junior 
managers and some of the workers may be redeployed elsewhere in the group. In the 
undiversified firm, the situation is different; all managers and workers may be 
unemployed after closing plant. This absence of future possibilities may discourage 
both senior and junior managers from closing. Grant noted that undiversified firms in 
the declining UK cutlery industry often failed to quit voluntarily.2 
A third aspect of the competitive structure may give rise to an exit barrier: multiplant 
firms may have an advantage over single-plant firms in adjustment. When a single-plant 
firm closes, it bears all the costs of closure - and its competitors capture the benefits of 
the capacity reduction. In contrast, when a multiplant firm which has a significant share 
of the industry’s output closes a plant, the firm is able to capture some of the gains of 
the capacity reduction through higher prices and better plant utilization in the remaining 
plants.3 
The presence in an industry of both single-plant, undiversified firms and multiplant, 
diversified businesses may be detrimental to the quality of the adjustment process. The 
efficiency of operations is not the only factor affecting the order of closure; of equal 
importance is the efficiency of adjustment. If the ‘least efficient’ plants (in the sense of 
operational efficiency) happen to be owned by the single-plant, undiversified firms, 
these may not be closed before some of the relatively more efficient plants of 
multiplant, diversified firms. Multiplant and diversified firms may have a greater 
comparative advantage in quitting than in staying because their barriers to exit are 
lower. As a result the wrong kind of resources (i.e. the less efficient plants) may be 
stuck in the industry, to the detriment of the firms and their customers. 
Competition or Co-operation? 
Which is better in overcoming excess capacity: competition or co-opera- tion? 
Traditionally, economists have argued that cartels hinder the ef- ficiency of the market 
mechanism; however, in the presence of market failure (a sign that there are 
externalities), collective action can allow externalities to be internalized and the process 
improved. The exit barriers highlighted above are externalities: if single-plant firms can 
join multiplant firms then some of their exit barriers may  be overcome. Likewise, the 
linking of undiversified firms to diversified firms may eliminate exit barriers. 
Bower’s analysis suggests that there is more to it than this and he argues that the 
usefulness of collective action depends crucially on its timing. He says that managerial 
thinking must pass through three stages before the crisis (excess capacity) can be 
resolved, and that cartels and co-operation will only help in the third stage.4 In the first 
stage, optimism prevails: each downturn in demand and adverse event is seen as an 
exception to the historic pattern. Downswings will be followed by upturns - and the 
greater the downswings, the greater the belief in the succeeding recovery. During this 
phase managerial activities are directed at preparing for the recovery and tend to ignore 
any crisis or treat it as temporary. Co-operation at this stage is unlikely to alleviate 
excess capacity. 
In the second stage, Bower argues, managers no longer hold optimistic beliefs and 
accept that a profound crisis may have occurred. However, they view the cause of the 
crisis as deriving from actions of competitors and outsiders such as the government. As 
a result, or in addition, each believes that it is someone else’s job to resolve the crisis. 
During this phase, behaviour becomes entrenched; government may be lobbied for 
support and competitors cajoled into quitting. Co-operation at this stage is unlikely to 
be successful if it is designed to encourage competitors to quit. It is likely that all 
players hold similar beliefs and that there will consequently be no agreement and so no 
resolution to the crisis.   
In the third phase, firms cross the watershed by accepting that they themselves are to 
blame for the excess capacity and poor profitability. This is evidenced by taking action 
not only in the form of closing plant but also in investment in new technology. In 
overcoming the exit barriers, there may be bilateral or multilateral deals between 
competitors. These will differ from those of the second phase - the actors are not 
looking for someone else to take action for them but rather co-ordinating and 
reinforcing initiatives from within each enterprise. 
The following analysis of the steel castings industry examines not only the 
competitive and co-operative aspects of the adjustment process but also the timing of 
the attempts at co-operating within the industry. 
The description of the UK steel castings industry which follows is based on several 
sources: government statistics, financial data from Companies House and data provided 
by the trade association SCRATA.5 This was supplemented by interviews with chief 
executives and senior decision makers of a wide range of firms accounting for two 
thirds of the industry’s output, and with others such as the Bank of England, 
government departments and the intermediary merchant bank Lazard. 
Characteristics of the UK Steel Castings Industry in 1975 
In 1975, castings were an important component in many mechanical products, and the 
steel castings industry had a wide and diverse customer 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Output and profitability of UK steel foundries, 1959-1983 Source: SCRATA 
 
 
 
base. The product was typically made to order in batches using the traditional labour-
intensive green sand process.6 
The four largest firms in the industry were multiplant: F. H. Lloyd, the Weir Group, 
the Davy Corporation and British Steel (then state-owned) controlled 60 per cent of the 
output. The next largest multiplant firms controlled a further 15 per cent. The remaining 
25 per cent of the industry was accounted for by some 60 smaller plants. Competition 
among firms was based mainly on price, with quality and speed of delivery the other 
important factors. Not all firms were equally successful: large size helped a little, but 
more importantly there was considerable ‘craft skill’ in making castings, permitting 
many smaller plants and single-plant firms to be successful. There were some 
substitutes, such as iron castings, but little foreign competition, direct imports and 
exports generally being less than 20 per cent of UK consumption. The customers, 
however, were subject to strong foreign competition, and this coupled with the fact that 
they were all part of the capital goods industry meant that castings sale were volatile 
Prior to 1975, for as long as many of the managers can remember, profitability and 
output have moved in cycles, albeit irregular ones. Figure 8.1 shows industry data from 
1959 indicating peaks in 1960, 1965, 1969 and 1975, with a clearly discernible 
downward trend in output since 1964. Between 1975 and 1983, orders and output fell in 
an unprecedented fashion by more than 50 per cent. Excess capacity arose and persisted 
for more than a decade, causing major changes in the industry. 
 
 
 
The Investment Boom, 1975-1978 
 
First I consider the events immediately after the 1975 peak. Between 1975 and 1978 
output declined from 268,000 tonnes to 204,000 tonnes, the latter figure being similar 
to the rate of production at the depth of the previous cycle in 1972. Although there was 
said to be a cutback on overtime working during this period, ‘layoffs’ of workers only 
started in earnest in 1978. Consequently, productivity, measured crudely as output in 
tonnes per worker, fell from a peak of 12,600 in 1975 to 11,400 in 1978 (see table 8.1). 
Capital was not adjusting: only one closure of any significance took place, when F. H. 
Lloyd closed 2,300 tonnes of capacity at Darlington in 1975 (representing 1 per cent of 
the industry’s capacity). Capacity utilization, measured crudely on a 1975 base, fell 
from 100 per cent in 1975 to 77 per cent in 1978. 
Most (though not all) firms were strongly optimistic about the future, as is evident 
from their reluctance to lay off workers and close plant. Because this industry ‘makes to 
order’, output lags orders; finished inventories are negligible, and the immediate labour 
requirements are known. The fact that firms did not adjust their labour indicates that 
they expected sales to rise. Their optimism was also evident in their investment 
behaviour. According to a financial analysis of a sample of company accounts, between 
1975 and 1977 the industry increased its rate of capital spending from 4 per cent of 
turnover to more than 6 per cent despite falling orders and falling profits. The 
government-sponsored Ferrous Foundries Aid scheme helped finance some of the 
investment, and this scheme was explicitly designed to increase capacity by up to 12 
per cent.7 Although not all the aid monies were spent, the investment boom and 
contemporary statements confirm that managers were forecasting an upturn in 1978. 
With the benefit of hindsight, this optimism seems wholly unjustified, but as 
explained by Bower, Lorange and Nelson, and the opening chapter of this book, at the 
time things looked different.8 Each fall in demand was accompanied by the expectation 
that ‘things must improve’. 
Adjustment by the Leaders, 1978-1981 
The average profitability of plants in the industry was more than 8 per cent of sales in 
1975; by 1978 it had fallen to 3 per cent, and by 1979 the majority of firms were not 
only unprofitable (accounting losses of 2 per cent) but also losing cash. This collapse in 
profitability was caused by the unexpected and continual fall in orders. In response, the 
two largest firms in the industry, Lloyd and Weir, closed three plants totalling 17,500 
tonnes (nearly 7 per cent of the industry’s capacity); a further 11,500 tonnes was closed 
by 
 
 
 
 
- indicates not applicable. 
* Estimated. 
b
 Capacity figures are based on estimated 1975 output and exclude the effect of the Ferrous Foundries Aid 
Scheme. From 1984 onwards, they become less reliable due to investment and reconstruction behaviour of 
firms. 
Sour ce: SCRATA and interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
smaller firms, most of whom were diversified and quit the industry to concentrate their 
resources elsewhere. Despite this capacity adjustment, plant utilization declined from 76 
per cent in 1978 to 66 per cent in 1981. 
The less than perfect adjustment of capital contrasted with more effective labour 
Table 8.1 Capacity, output, employment, capacity utilization, productivity and profitability in the UK steel castings industry, 1975-1988 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 198
1 
1982 198
3 
1984 1985 198
6 
1987 1988 
Output in year (’000 tonnes) 268 255 246 204 192 174 155 154 115 116 118 109 
_ _ 
New series          126 128 119 122 120"  
Labour at year  end ('000 people) 21.3 20.8 20.4 17.9 16.7 14.2 12.6 11.5 8.6 8.0 7.5 7.0 6.0 n/ab Capacity year end (’000 tonnes) 268 266 266 266 256 246 237 235 198 197 193 187 170 157 Productivity (’000 tonnes/man) 12.6 12.3 12.1 11.4 11.5 12.3 12.3 13.4 13.4 14.5 15.7 15.6 - - 
New series          15.8 17.1 17.0 20.3 n/ab 
Capacity utilization (%) 100 96 93 77 76 72 66 66 58 59 61 58 - - 
New series          64 66 64 72 76 
Profitability as % of turnover  9.0 8.5 7.5 3.0 (2.0) (1.0) 1.0 (1.7) 0.0 (1.6) (2.7) n/ab n/ab n/ab 
shedding, which helped improve productivity from 11,400 to 12,300 thousand tonnes 
per man. Because the labour effect outweighed the capital effect, by 1981 most firms 
had managed to record a small profit. 
In considering the capacity adjustment it is apparent that the larger firms in the 
industry were closing a disproportionate share of capacity; between 1975 and 1978 
Lloyd and Weir organized 60 per cent of the closing capacity and their market share (by 
value) fell from 41 per cent in 1975 to 24 per cent in 1981. More significantly, the 
plants they closed were not the least profitable in the industry, and some had not been 
recently modernized.9 
Because closures took place a long time before our interviews, it is hard to be certain 
as to why the least efficient plants were not closing. It is clear that the larger players, 
being multiplant and having a significant share of the industry, thought that they would 
be able to capture the gains from closing. It is also true that some of the diversified 
firms which quit believed that they could make greater profits in other industries. 
 
 
Stubborn Resistance, 1981-1983 
Although the rate of profit in 1981 seemed better than that in 1979, the situation facing 
many of the firms was worse. The costs of the layoffs and plant closures were 
substantial in terms of cash, balance sheet write-offs and management time. Redundant 
workers had to be redeployed, or paid severance money; closed plant could not be 
abandoned but had to be expensively dismantled and sites cleaned up. Many of these 
costs were not included in the normal profit and loss accounts. For the Weir group, 
these costs had undermined the strength of the firm, depleted cash reserves and forced 
them into financial reconstruction. The situation at Lloyd was little better. There was a 
strong feeling of resentment among the senior managers in these two firms who felt that 
‘the wrong plants were closing’ and that ‘it was about time someone else did some 
closing’. 
Executives from five firms - British Steel Corporation, Weir, Lloyd, North British, 
and Lake and Elliot (which together accounted for nearly half of the industry’s output) - 
met together in late 1980 and early 1981 to discuss the future. They concluded that 
there was a compelling need for the industry to reduce capacity, and that some 
mechanism was needed to encourage the smaller players to quit. The idea of a 
rationalizaton scheme found favour, so Ian MacGregor, chairman of British Steel, 
approached 
Lazard, who agreed to take on the task without fee and appointed their vice-chairman 
Peter Grant to supervise the task. 
Lazard’s plan was simple: all the firms in the industry should be persuaded to 
contribute to a fund; these monies - together with a grant from the government - should 
be used to pay the smaller firms to close capacity. Since all firms which did not close 
would benefit from the actions of those which did close, the scheme should have 
allowed the benefits and costs to be roughly matched and speed up the process of 
adjustment. 
Lazard’s scheme had much merit, and it also showed that the organizers were aware 
of the faults of the Davignon cartels described by Shaw and Shaw, Shaw and Simpson, 
Joliet and Foroutan.10 Those cartels did not have incentive schemes paying firms to 
close capacity. As a result, many of the Davignon agreements were not binding, and 
firms often failed to deliver the promised capacity reductions. 
It is not surprising that the Lazard ideas appealed to the Bank of England, which at 
the time was concerned about the possible collapse of some of the major firms in the 
industry. It also appealed to the larger firms in the industry. A year after their first 
initiative in April 1982, Lazard announced a scheme for those specializing in high alloy 
production." Two of the largest firms, APV and Weir, together with the government 
paid for the closure of five small foundries accounting for about 1 per cent of the 
industry’s output. The cash incentives were large, about 30 per cent of one year’s sales 
for the closing plant. The organizers openly admitted that this was a pilot scheme 
intended to encourage and demonstrate to the rest of the industry what a rationalization 
scheme could achieve. 
The full rationalization scheme was much harder to achieve than anticipated; apart 
from the original five, only a few firms which did not wish to close were willing to 
come forward and volunteer a contribution to the fund. Smaller firms were openly 
distrustful of Lazard, whom they saw as being too closely involved with British Steel, 
one of the larger players, and they resented the attempt by the large players to gain 
market share through forcing out the smaller firms. Things got worse when a key 
player, Lloyd - the largest firm in the industry - pulled out of the scheme in December 
1981; they had been the subject of a takeover raid and the new management publicly 
announced their withdrawal. 
The resentment and the lack of volunteers to contribute to the fund were less serious 
than the absence of prospective closers. Even the promise of cash did not bring forth 
many volunteers. For obvious reasons, Lazard did not expect the large firms to 
volunteer, but the absence of small firms indicated that powerful exit barriers persisted. 
One barrier faced by the smaller firms was the extraordinarily high perceived cost of 
closure. In the interviews, some single-plant undiversified firms showed us their 
calculations, and these revealed that the cash costs were expected to be in excess of the 
‘30 per cent of sales’ offered by the scheme. In contrast, some diversified firms showed 
us their calculations revealing much lower anticipated costs, closer to zero. These 
perceived differences in closure costs are confirmed by examination of post-closure 
accounts. 
There were other problems for the undiversified single-plant firms: closure of plant 
meant loss of jobs for all managers as there was no other business within the firm to go 
to. Several of the smaller firms said that they had not undertaken any formal analysis of 
closure as the option was ‘unthinkable’. Grant notes that this kind of psychological 
barrier was also present in the cutlery industry, where bankruptcy was the principal 
mechanism for forcing small plants to close.12 
The Lazard Scheme and the Quality of Adjustment in 1983 
Although Lazard officially abandoned the idea of the scheme in 1982, many in the 
industry believed that something would still happen. In particular, the few firms 
planning closure, mostly parts of diversified enterprises, realized that it was worth 
waiting. The difference between closing in 1982 and receiving no money and waiting 
possibly a year or two and receiving a large grant to close, persuaded potential closers 
to sit tight and stay open.13 
Weir and the Bank of England, together with those who wanted to close, lobbied 
Lazard to reconsider the situation. With the help of £6 million from the government, 
they persuaded Lloyd and a number of other firms to change their position and an 
agreement was signed in February 1983 whereby 36,700 tonnes of capacity (14 per cent 
of the industry’s 1975 total) would be closed by the end of 1983. 
In the end, closers received about 30 per cent of annual sales in cash. About half of 
the non-closers contributed £12 million over several years at a rate of 2\ per cent of 
average 1980-2 sales between the years 1983 and 1988. 
The scheme, whilst not a failure, could hardly be described as a great success for the 
initiating firms. The amount of closed capacity was less than half the overcapacity of 
82,000 tonnes in 1981. Given that no plant had closed for two years, the rate of closing 
was only a little more than that of the years 1980 and 1981. More significantly, the 
scheme did not persuade many of the small operators to quit. 
The quality of the adjustment left much to be desired. In table 8.2,1 show the 
profitability, size and extent of diversification of a selection of both the closing and 
non-closing firms representing about 90 per cent of the industry’s capacity. Profitability 
is measured for 1977 as operating profit divided by sales; and for the period 1980-1 as 
net profit before interest, tax and depreciation (i.e. cash flow) divided by sales. The 
latter is a crude measure of the efficiency of plant in 1982. The table reveals that many 
of the least efficient plants did not close. Ten of the non-closing plants were less 
efficient than the Wednesbury plant of Lloyd which closed, and Wednes- bury was a 
large plant of 12,400 tonnes capacity. The Wellman and Sheepbridge plants which also 
closed were more efficient than many which did not close. 
It was the multiplant operators such as Lloyd, Sheffield Forgemasters and Davy 
Corporation which contributed 23,700 tonnes of closed capacity. (Sheffield 
Forgemasters is not shown in the table due to an absence of financial data.) Diversified 
firms contributed most of the rest: the 3i Group (part -owned by the Bank of England), 
Reynolds and British Steel (BSC) (also not included in the table) closed 12,300 tonnes. 
Only one undiversified single-plant firm closed: it contributed 700 tonnes. 
Although some of the diversified and multiplant firms such as BTR did not close 
their unprofitable plants, the extent of diversification of the majority of the remaining 
plants was less than that of the closers: 3i Group, GKN, Davy and Reynolds. 
 
Reconstruction, 1984-1988 
The signing of the Lazard scheme coincided with another dramatic fall in output from 
154,000 tonnes in 1982 to 115,000 tonnes in 1983, and so capacity utilization at the end 
of the scheme was worse than at the beginning. Labour shedding continued, but only as 
fast as the decline in output, so productivity per worker remained static at 13,400 tonnes 
per annum. Fortunately rising prices allowed the industry to break even. 
The Lazard scheme also marked the end of an era; many firms in the industry were 
convinced that a new approach was needed to resolve their problems. Some firms, such 
as Blackett Hutton, Mech Cast and Hyde, had made profits throughout the lean years, 
suggesting that the problems of the loss-making firms were as much their own fault as 
that of the competitors’ exit barriers. In this period, a new industry leader emerged 
which had no association with the Lazard scheme and the old leaders: William Cook. 
Andrew Cook, a lawyer, inherited the family firm, William Cook, and took control 
of about 2 per cent of the industry output. He set about changing first his firm and then 
the industry. Whilst most of the industry was hoping for salvation through Lazard, he 
had slimmed down his operations so that he was making a profit. In 1983, with a major 
investment programme, he set about modernizing his plant to improve the quality of 
castings, raise productivity and expand capacity. In 1984 profits rose to 10 per cent of 
sales whilst profits fell for the industry as a whole. 
  
Company 
Profita
l 1980-81* 
r ility 
1977* 
Share 
of 
capacit
y 
Owners Sales of 
group 
(£m) 
Diversification 
ratioi 
(a) Survivors 
Brockhouse 
-8.8 11.5 0.6 Brockhouse 73 38 
Alfred Steel -6.0 2.9 0.5 Alfred Steel 1 1 
Tennent -4.3 2.2 3.4 Sheffield Forge Masters 214 32 
Larkhall -4.0 20.6 0.5 G. Blair  14 7 
Paramount -3.6 4.9 1.9 APV Holdings 293 23 
Wilsons -2.3 16.3 1.1 BTR 515 194 
Cronite 2.2 8.0 0.3 Cronite Group 11 3 
Fir th Brown 2.3 -1.4 1.4 Johnson, & Fir th Brown 210 41 
Holbrook 2.7 17.1 0.8 Weir Group 137 23 
Cattons 3.9 15.5 6.6 Weir Group 137 10 
Goodwin 5.2 0.1 0.6 Goodwin 5 3 
W. Cook 7.2 15.0 2.4 W. Cook 4 1 
Blair  7.5 9.4 7.3 G. Blair  14 1 
Edgar Allen 7.7 1.5 3.6 Aurora Holdings 91 15 
Davy Rolls 7.7 1.2 1.1 Davy Corp 924 88 
Lake & Elliot 8.4 20.8 1.1 Lake & Elliot 25 4 
Burton 9.0 3.8 4.8 F. H. Lloyd Holdings 80 7 
Jopling 9.2 6.5 3.1 Weir Group 137 25 
Hopkinsons 9.5 n/a  1.3 Hopkinsons Holdings 36 2 
North British 10.1 10.4 4.6 North British Steel Group 11 I 
Parker  10.8 10.9 2.5 F. H. Lloyd 80 12 
Hyde 11.5 10.5 2.4 Hyde Industr ial 5 I 
Mech-cast 16.6 18.4 0.8 Mech-cast 1.7 2 
Bonds 17.9 5.9 0.6 Bonds 1 1 
Blackett Hutton 22.9 12.4 1.7 Crane 33 8 
 - indicates not applicable; n/a indicates data not available. 
• Cash flow/sales where cash flow is net profit before tax, interest and depreciation. b Operating 
profit/sales where operating profit is net profit before tax and interest. c Based on estimated output in 
tonnes in 1975. d Diversification ratio is the ratio of total firm sales to plant sales. 
' Assets not sales. 
Sour ce: Financial data from Companies House; table reproduced by permission of the Economic Jour na l 
 
(b) Management Buy-outs (1982-3) 
Shaw -7.0 5.2 1.0 Ley’s Foundries 22 10 
Wolsingham -1.3 13.8 1.4 British Ship builders 873 140 
National 6.0 4.1 1.2 Lake and Elliott 25 5 
(c) Closures (1982-3) 
Ryders -11.7 7.8 0.3 Ryders 0.7 1 
Holcroft -6.7 5.7 1.3 Reynolds Metals Inc. 1,670 179 
Triangle -2.6 -6.7 0.5 Finance for  Industry 1,135'  1,135 
Broadbent - 1.5 0.9 1.6 Finance for  Industry 1,135'  426 
Head Wrightson -0.7 0.1 4.1 Davy 924 121 
Wellman 2.6 0.7 0.1 Wellman 40 19 
Wednesbury 4.1 7.5 4.6 F. H. Lloyd 80 48 
Sheepbridge 9.5 13.6 0.3 GKN 1,762 706 
(d) Closures (1979 80) 
Spotborough - 2.2 1.5 Ward Group 26 n/a 
K. L. Foundry - 3.6 2.0 600 Group 133 n/a 
O. H. Foundry - 4.1 3.8 Weir Group 137 n/a 
Alston - 9.7 0.7 F. H. Lloyd 80 n/a 
Cook’s view was that the industry only had itself to blame for its problems. In a 
contemporary statement repeated later in a public interview he said: ‘In the 1970s the 
industry was grossly over-manned; costs were rising and only world demand sustained 
it ... The slump (of the early 1980s) was good for the foundry industry. Many companies 
were not fit to survive.’14 Cook did not stop at putting his own company on a secure 
footing: in 1986 he made a bid for Hyde’s foundries, which failed. He then bid for the 
entire castings operations of Weir. The industry was amazed at the audacity of such a 
small player seeking to take over the largest operator after failing to capture a more 
modest player. Some thought him mad to buy deeper into a troubled industry. Cook’s 
bid was successful, and he set about rationalizing the combined businesses, closing the 
Jopling plant. In 1988, Cook again bid for Hyde and this time he was successful. By the 
end of 1988, Cook was by far the largest firm in the industry with more than 30 per cent 
of the output; and it was profitable. 
Cook’s lead was followed by others such as Aurora, and Lake and Elliot, who also 
invested, merged and reconstructed. In 1988, the industry looked very different from 
that of 1975. It is obviously too early to draw definitive conclusions on the success of 
these activities, but it seems that the industry is now much fitt er. In the process of 
reconstruction, several of the old leaders have disappeared: British Steel quit during the 
Lazard scheme; Weir was bought out by Cook; Aurora (Edgar Allen) bought North 
British Steel in 1988 and closed its Edgar Allen foundry, rationalizing output; Lake and 
Elliot bought the big APV Paramount foundry in Sussex and embarked on 
rationalization. Between 1984 and 1988, almost 40,000 tonnes of nominal capacity was 
closed. The deals by Cook, Aurora, and Lake and Elliot contributed 21,500 of nominal 
closed capacity. Lloyd closed a further 6,700 tonnes, and the Ford Motor Company 
much of the remainder. 
The reconstruction involved more than closures: there was investment shifting the 
firms away from producing the low-value, variable quality carbon steel castings by 
traditional methods, towards producing higher- value, highef-quality alloy castings by 
new methods. In 1975, carbon steel castings accounted for about 70 per cent of the 
tonnage; by 1988 that figure was less than 40 per cent. 
How did the firms overcome the exit barriers which had plagued the industry 
previously? In examining the kinds of firms which undertook the reconstruction, it is 
notable that Cook, and Lake and Elliot were not large, diversified groups, but relatively 
small firms. However, they were not loath to undertake investment and used co-
operation to gain resources, persuad- ing banks and others to assist them. In addition, 
they used mergers as a way of buying up competitors to get rid of capacity. Although 
this was costly, they believed that it was necessary. 
Simultaneously, and probably consequently, between 1983 and 1988 output became 
less volatile, varying between 115,000 tonnes (in 1983) and 128,000 tonnes (in 1985) 
stabilizing at about 120,000 tonnes in 1988. Since capacity was falling, capacity 
utilizaton rose sharply, but because of investment, reconstruction and new data series it 
is hard to be precise. Using historic data it seems that capacity utilization rose to 75 per 
cent, but the trade association claims that the real figure is higher.  
Labour shedding and redeployment continued also at a rapid pace: employment fell 
from 8,500 people in 1983 to 6,000 in 1988, and output per man rose from less than 
13,500 tonnes in 1983 (the highest since before 1975) to more than 20,000 tonnes in 
1987. Not surprisingly, the industry was profitable in 1988 and many felt that it could 
now go forward. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The steel castings industry took more than ten years to adjust to changing demand. 
Several factors help explain why this was so. First, in common with firms in many 
other industries, there were considerable exit barriers in the form of high sunk costs and 
difficulties and costs in laying off workers and closing plant. Secondly, the presence of 
undiversified single-plant firms compounded the problems. Third, and equally 
important, were behavioural factors: optimism and the belief by each firm that others 
should act first. 
Bower’s description of the three steps of reconstruction represents a useful, albeit 
simplified, paradigm and it helps us to understand and appreciate why collective action 
at some times helps and at other times hinders the process.15 There was clearly an initial 
period when, in response to falling demand, the majority of managers expressed 
optimism by refusing to shed labour, not closing plant but undertaking investment 
designed to create more capacity. In the next period there was a variety of responses. A 
few firms saw the problems coming and quit the industry, thereby indicating purposeful 
resolve. The majority remained, shed labour and cut back investment. In addition, the 
two largest firms which were multiplant closed substantial capacity. 
Had such action continued, the industry might have recovered quite quickly, going 
directly from the first to the third phase of Bower’s process and not passing through the 
second phase. This was not to happen: a third, regressive period - that of ‘stubborn 
resistance’ corresponding to Bower’s second phase - appeared. In response to further 
declines in demand, the industry  leaders stopped their closing activities and instead 
tried to per- suade the smaller firms to quit. They went about this plan by proposing a 
rationalization scheme and persuading Lazard Brothers, the merchant bank, to execute 
their plan. Lazard found the scheme hard to implement in the face of resistance from 
the smaller firms of the industry and from the Treasury. Eventually, with the help of the 
Bank of England, they did achieve an agreement and gained government assistance, but 
the outcome was different from that originally anticipated. It was the multiplant 
diversified firms, not the smaller firms, which did the closing, and the amount closed 
was much less than originally anticipated. Co-operation between firms in the industry 
in this phase seems to have been a hindrance not a help. 
Then following the final period (corresponding to Bower’s third phase) when several 
firms launched major internal investment plans designed to overcome past inherent 
weaknesses. These initiatives were followed by mergers with other firms and massive 
reconstruction of the industry with more labour shedding and capacity reduction. In this 
period, co-operation of a more conventional nature, that is mergers, seems to have been 
more successful. 
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